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RACIAL PROFIliNG AND THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT: APPLYING THE MINORITY 
VICTIM PERSPECTIVE TO ENSURE EQUAL 
PROTECTION UNDER THE lAW 
PETER A. LYLE* 
Abstract: Racial profiling was once thought the figment of an overactive 
minority imagination. Yet, recent media coverage has thrust the reality 
of racial bias in law enforcement into the national spotlight. Despite its 
newfound popularity, the real battle for equal protection and justice 
under the law has been quietly raging across American courtrooms for 
decades, and it is a battle that people of color continue to lose. This 
Note examines the judiciary'S tendency to excise racial perceptions and 
bias from its analysis of racial profiling cases under the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. Focusing on the recent profiling case of 
Brown v. City of Oneonta, this Note suggests that the imposition of race 
ignorant standards is itself a subtle but powerful vestige of racial bias in 
the courtroom. By more broadly considering the subjective perceptions 
of both police and minority victims of discriminatory police practices, 
courts will be more responsive to the coercive nature of certain police 
stops, as well as the discriminatory intent behind abusive police 
investigations. 
"We the People" no longer enslave, but the credit does not belong to the jimners. It 
belongs to those who refused to acquiesce in outdated notions of "liberty, " 
"justice, " and "equalit)l, " and who stlived to better them. 
-Thurgood Marshall! 
Sixty miles west of Albany lies the small town of Oneonta, New 
York.2 Of the town's 10,000 full-time residents, fewer than 300 are 
* Note Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL (2000-2001). 
1 Thurgood Marshall. Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitlltion, 101 
HARV. L. REv. 1. 5 (1987). 
2 See Brown v. Oneonta, 195 F.3d 111. 116-19 (2d Cir. 1999). amended and vacated by 
Brown v. Oneonta. 221 F.3d 329, 334-36 (2d CiL 2000). The tortured procedural history of 
Brown llIay itself be indicative of the difficulties and inconsistencies that arise when courts 
apply race-ignorant analysis to racial profiling claims. See 221 F.3d at 329; 195 F.3d at 111. 
The District Court in Brown issued four separate opinions after both sides to the dispute 
llIade several 1Il0tions for reconsideration. See 221 F.3d at 335-36 (recounting procedural 
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black.3 Nine years ago, near the outskirts of town, the peace of this 
close community was shattered when someone broke into a house and 
attacked an elderly woman.4 The woman could not identify her at-
tacker's face, but she knew that he had a knife and that he had suf-
fered a cut on his hand during the assault. 5 Based on his quick move-
ments and a glimpse of his hand and forearm, the elderly woman was 
convinced that the culprit was young, black, and male.6 
The police arriving at the scene began an investigation immedi-
ately.' A canine unit tracked the suspect's trail to the State University 
of New York College at Oneonta (SUCO).8 SUCO has a population of 
about 7,500 students, roughly 150 of whom are black.9 Using the 
woman's description of her attacker, the police obtained a list from 
college officials of every black male on campus and tried to locate and 
question them all.10 
When this strategy proved unsuccessful, the police widened their 
sweep to encompass the entire town, stopping and questioning over 
200 people of color-including, allegedly, some women-whom they 
could find on public transportation and in the streets.ll Although the 
perpetrator was never actually found, many members of the Oneonta 
black community emerged from the experience feeling hurt, humili-
ated, and angry.12 Ricky Brown and several minority plaintiffs subse-
quently filed a claim that they were discriminatorily searched and 
seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment and the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 13 The resulting case was 
Brown v. City of Oneonta. 14 
history leading to amended opinion). On appeal, a threejudge panel of the Second Cir-
cuit dismissed the plaintiffs' § 1983 claims under the Equal Protection Clause and, with 
regard to several plaintiffs, denied their Fourth Amendment claims. See 195 F.3d at 123. 
The following year, the panel abruptly reversed itself 011 several Fourth Amendment claims 
while adhering to its decision that the police sweep did not involve any discriminatory 
intent. See 221 F.3d at 336. This Note considers both the original and amended opinions of 
Brown 5 threejudge panel. See discussion i njia Parts II, III. 
3 See Brown, 221 F.3d at 334. 
4 See id. 
5 See id. 
6 See id. 
i See id. 
S See Brown, 221 F.3d at 334. 
9 See id. 
10 See id. 
11 See id. 
12 See id. 
13 See Brown, 221 F.3d at 334--35. 
14 See ill. at 329-37. 
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Although they lost at the District Court level, the plaintiffs in 
Brown went on to appeal,l5 A threejudge panel of the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit stated that the police did not violate the 
Equal Protection Clause because they were merely engaged in routine 
detective work. 16 In the eyes of the court, the decision to use a de-
scription based almost solely on race and gender in a criminal investi-
gation was not an impermissible policy based on race, but an action 
that was entirely within the scope of police discretionP Moreover, al-
though several plaintiffs received abusive and threatening treatment 
from the police, the panel reasoned that they were not unlawfully de-
tained under the Fourth Amendment because they were never held 
against their will.l8 Months later, the panel would issue an amended 
opinion that continued to ignore racial bias in the Oneonta police 
sweep.19 
The Second Circuit's ruling sparked reactions across the coun-
try.20 One commentator said, "This [goes] far beyond the problem of 
driving while black. People were being stopped in Oneonta for breath-
ing while black."21 Another writer complained, "It's one thing to be 
the target of an individual's bigotry. It's quite another to have one 
arm of government discriminate against an entire race and then have 
another one give that action legal cover."22 Even New York State At-
torney General Eliot Spitzer, whose office was obliged by law to de-
15 See id. 
16 See id. at 337; Brown, 195 F.3d at 119. I had the opportunity to witness the oral argu-
ment on June 4, 1999 before (now) Chief Judge John M. \"I'alker, Jr. (who authored both 
opinions) , Judge James L. Oakes, and the Honorable Richard W. Goldberg of the United 
States Court of International Trade, sitting by designation. Sep id. at Ill. 
17 See Brown, 221 F.3d at 337; Brown, 195 F.3d at 119. 
18 See Brown. 221 F.3d at 337; Brown. 195 F.3d at 121-22. 
19 See BrowI/, 221 F.3d at 337. The text of the superseding opinion was virtually identi-
cal to the original except for several surgically amended sections of its analysis. See id. 
Moreover, while the amended opinion was imbued with some new placatory language, the 
court stubbornly refused to apply the Equal Protection Clause because it found no dis-
criminatory intent in the police investigation in Oneonta. See id. at 336-39. 
20 These reactions came on the heels of the court's original opinion. Compare Brown, 
221 F.3d at 337, with Brown. 195 F.3d at 121-22. 
21 See Bob Herbert, When Race Defines the Suspects. NEWS & OBSER\'ER (Raleigh. N.C.), 
Nov. 5, 1999, at A25. The colloquial phrase "driving while black," or "DWB" describes the 
phenomenon of discriminatory traffic stops and is discussed in more detail in Part I of this 
Note. See discussion illJi'a Part I. 
22 See DeWayne Wickham, Appeals Court Decision Prof)S up Institutional Racism, GANNETT 
NEWS SER\'ICE, Nov. II, 1999, available at 1999 WL 6978113. 
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fend the police in Brown said, "You know what? We won the case, but 
it makes your skin crawl. "23 
This combined feeling of anger and dread still resonates deep 
within the heart of the black community. In fact, Mrican Americans 
have endured an uneasy relationship with American law enforcement 
for decades. At the turn of the twenty-first century, nearly every major 
urban area has had its share of infamous profiling headlines: Boston 
had Charles Stuart's false allegations that a black man killed his preg-
nant wife (sparking an infamous round of police sweeps of black 
neighborhoods); New York had the acquitted police slaying of Ama-
dou Diallo (as he reached for his wallet on his doorstep); and New 
Jersey had to fire Colonel Carl Williams, superintendent of its state 
troopers, for racist remarks about minorities and drug trafficking. 24 
The colloquial phrase "Driving While Black," long a sardonic truism 
among Mrican Americans, has now entered the modern vernacular as 
a testament to the reality of racial bias in law enforcement.25 
These trends have initiated strong discourse on Fourth Amend-
ment prohibitions against illegal search and seizure, as well as, in 
some instances, on the proper application of the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.26 Despite strong criticism, 
however, courts have tended to approach claims of police abuse with 
skepticism and occasionally flagrant disregard for the experiences of 
minority victims.27 This Note discusses the development of the courts' 
23 See Herbert, supra note 21, at A25. 
24 See Katheryn K. Russell, The Racial Hoax as Clime: The Law as Affirmation, 71 IND. LJ. 
593, 597 (1996) (discussing the Charles Stual't hoax in Boston, in which a white man 
falsely claimed a black lllan shot him and killed his pl'egnant wife); Lisa L. Waltel~ Eradicat-
ing Racial Stereotypingfi'om Terry Stops: The Case for an Equal Protection Exclusionary Rule, 71 U. 
COLO. L. RET. 255, 260 (2000); Howard Chua-Eoan, Black and Bille, TIME, Mar. 6, 2000, at 
24 (discussing police brutality and race and the acquitted slaying of Amadou Diallo by four 
white police in New York). Walter discusses the firing of Colonel Carl Williams, fonner 
superintendent of New Jersey's state troopers. See ""alter, supra, at 260. Governor Christine 
Todd \Vhitman fired Williams for racist remarks concerning drug crimes and minorities. 
[d. Williams was quoted as saying, "[Clocaine and marijuana traffickel's were most likely to 
be members of minority groups." [d. He denied condoning racial targeting, but said, "[Ilt 
would be naive to think that race was not an issue in drug trafficking." [d. 
25 See DAVID HARRIS, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, DRIVING WHILE BLACK: RACIAL 
PROFILING ON OUR NATION'S HIGHWAYS 1-8 (1999). This report was prepm'ed by the 
American Civil Liberties Union, "a nationwide nonpartisan organization of 275,000 mem-
bers dedicated to preserving and defending the principles set forth in the Bill of Rights." 
[d. at 1. The autlIOl' of the report, David Harris, is a Professor of Law at the University of 
Toledo College of Law. [d. He has authored numerous scholarly articles on the subjects of 
I'acial profiling and search and seizure. See id. 
26 See id. 
27 See id. 
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treatment of Fourth Amendment and Equal Protection claims in the 
context of racial profiling cases. In particular, it will focus on the ten-
dency of courts to ignore prevailing racial tensions felt by minority 
victims of police investigations while imposing race-ignorant assump-
tions in Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment analysis.28 
This judicial strategy, described by some as a "race-neutral" ap-
proach, ignores existing racial attitudes and potential discriminatory 
animus in law enforcement.29 Moreover, it invalidates significant per-
ceptions of fear and mistrust among many black victims.30 As a result, 
courts are unresponsive to the sense of fear and powerlessness felt by 
blacks during police search and seizures, and they do not adequately 
acknowledge the discriminatory intent behind some profiling tech-
niques. A heightened sensitivity to both factors-how racial percep-
tions affect minority victims and how racial biases motivate discrimi-
natory policies-could produce more equitable results under the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Part I of this Note describes some of the statistical data support-
ing claims that racial profiling disproportionately impacts minority 
groups.31 It also recounts some of the historical development of the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and of the judiciary'S race-
ignorant approach in resolving racial profiling cases.32 Part II contin-
ues to explore how courts have misconstrued Equal Protection claims 
by downplaying racially discriminatory animus in police actions.33 Part 
III argues that judges must broaden their understanding of the vic-
tim's perspective in Fourth Amendment cases, while extending their 
analysis of discriminatory animus in construing Equal Protection 
claims.34 Part IV suggests that by developing a more sophisticated 
awareness of indicia of racial bias, judges can more equitably consider 
racial profiling claims. This Note concludes that, in the interest of 
balancing effective law enforcement and fair treatment for people of 
28 ""'hile my analysis considers the broad experiences and perceptions of people of 
color in racial profiling cases, it tends to focus on the Mrican-American perspective. There 
is dear overlap in the histories of all non-white people in America when discussing these 
perspectives, but an in-depth examination of the entire diaspora of racial and ethnic 
groups in America is beyond the scope of this Note. 
29 See Anthony C. Thompson, StOflPillg the Usual SusjJccts: Rnce and the Fourth Amendment, 
74 N.Y.D. L. RE\,. 956,1002-05 (1999) (offering an intricate discussion of the race neutral 
approach b\' the judiciary in the context of the Fourth Amendment). 
30 See id. 
3! Seediscussion infi'll Part I and notes 36-120. 
32 See discussion injm Part I and notes '~6-120. 
33 Seediscussion inji'a Part II and notes 121-146. 
34 Seediscussion inji'a Part III and notes 147-276. 
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color, a judiciary with a heightened sensitivity to existing racial per-
ceptions among minority detainees would provide a more just remedy 
to the profiling problem.35 
I. RACIAL PROFILING IN AMERICA: SEARCHES, SEIZURES, AND DRIVING 
WHILE BLACK 
Although it has received heightened media coverage of late, ra-
cial profiling in law enforcement is not a new trend, and can be 
traced, in part, to street-level law enforcement.36 "Driving While 
Black," or "DWB," has become one of the most familiar vestiges of this 
phenomenon.37 DWB describes abusive police stops and searches of 
people of color on America's highways.38 Some maintain that the 
trend began in the 1980s with the nation's stepped up war against 
drugs. 39 As a result of a renewed campaign against drug trafficking, 
many regions developed strategies designed to attack the street-level 
use of drugs.4o Such strategies pushed police to try to record more 
busts on the nation's roads, and created both spoken and unspoken 
policies for targeting racial minorities.41 
For example, the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Mo-
tor Vehicles issued guidelines for its policy in 1985 on "The Common 
Characteristics of Drug Couriers. "42 The guidelines directed state 
officers to "be suspicious of rental cars," of motorists who show "scru-
pulous obedience to traffic laws," of drivers wearing "lots of gold," or 
who do not "fit the vehicle," and ethnic groups "associated with the 
drug trade."43 Similarly, many cities began targeting poor, diverse ur-
ban areas where, to the public eye, the drug problem (namely the 
prevalence of the newly developed crack-cocaine) seemed most ram-
pant.44 
In the case of Chavez v. Illinois State Police, the American Civil Lib-
erties Union (ACLU) undertook the representation of a class of black 
35 See discussion infra Part IV and notes 277-304. 
36 See HARRIS, supra note 25, at 8. 
37 See id. 
38 See id.; Katheryn K. Russell, "Driving While Black": Corollmy Phenomenon and Collateral 
Consequences, 40 B.C. L. REv. 717, 720 (1999) (noting the disproportionate impact the 
DWB phenomenon has had on Mrican Americans who traveled extensively in their cars). 
39 See HARRIS, supra note 25, at 9. 
40 See id. 
41 See id. at 8-9. 
42 See id. at 8. 
43ld. (emphasis omitted). 
H See HARRIS, supra note 25, at 8. 
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and Hispanic motorists after receiving hundreds of complaints that 
the Illinois State Police were singling out people of color for highway 
drug searches.45 The ACLU submitted analyses to the court from sta-
tistical experts that concluded that state troopers assigned to a drug 
interdiction program called Operation Valkyrie were targeting motor-
ists of color for enforcement of the traffic code.46 Analyzing police 
data, the ACLU reported that, while Hispanics comprise less than 
eight percent of the Illinois population, and take fewer than three 
percent of the personal vehicle trips in Illinois, they comprise twenty-
three percent of individual searches conducted by Valkyrie police 
officers.47 Additionally, the report found that while Mrican Americans 
comprise less than fifteen percent of the Illinois population and take 
approximately ten percent of the personal vehicle trips in Illinois, 
they comprise twenty-three percent of the searches conducted by Val-
kyrie officers.48 
These findings support a common belief among people of color: 
That they disproportionately bear the brunt of crime-prevention ef-
forts by police.49 The convenient contention that people of color 
comprise the majority of people living in high crime areas and, thus, 
disproportionately commit crimes tends to ignore such national 
trends.50 For example, despite the fact that blacks actually constitute 
only about thirteen percent of the country's drug users, they make up 
thirty-seven percent of people arrested on drug charges, fifty-five per-
cent of those convicted, and seventy-four percent of all drug offend-
ers sent to prison.51 Moreover, reports indicate that the Mrican-
American proportion of drug arrests rose from twenty-five percent in 
1980 to thirty-seven percent in 1995.52 
It is inevitable that these increased profiling efforts, based implic-
itly or explicitly on racial factors, have caught many innocent people 
of color in the police dragnet.53 They also suggest that most of these 
45 See Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 27 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (N.D. Ill. 1998); HARRIS, supra 
note 25, at 27. 
46 See HARRIS, supra note 25, at 27. 
47 See id. at 28. 
48 See id. at 28-29. The ACLU analysis is based on state field reports filed in 1987 for 
motorists stopped on Illinois Highways; the data con"'rs eighteen Districts, which includes 
the drug interdiction unit. See id. 
49 See id. at 27-29. 
50 See id. 
51 See HARRIS, slljJm note 25, at II. 
52 See id. 
53 See id. 
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individuals have not benefited from full protection under our nation's 
laws.54 A brief look at the history of the Fourth Amendment, as well as 
the application of the Fourteenth Amendment, might begin to ex-
plain this effect. 
A. Rights Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures 
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the "right of people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures. "55 During the colonial period, the British 
subjected the colonists to many unreasonable and sometimes humili-
ating searches of their homes.56 Soon after the drafting of the U.S. 
Constitution, the Framers proposed an amendment to grant protec-
tion under English law; according to the amendment, each man's 
home was to be considered sacred ground where his person and pa-
pers could be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures.57 
The Fourth Amendment was thus not explicitly created with an eye 
towards protecting the liberty of people of color, but was instead 
rooted in anti-imperialist notions.58 One scholar nevertheless main-
tains that the proper purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to protect 
disfavored minority groupS.59 
The Founding Fathers wrote the first ten amendments with the 
intent to limit the new federal government that had been created.60 
They were unconcerned with violations of rights that state govern-
ments committed locally because they believed such violations were 
small enough to be limited by citizen pressure.61 But as early as the 
54 See id. 
55 See u.s. CONST. amend. IV. 
56 See ANN FAGAN GINGER, THE LAW, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PEOPLE'S RIGHTS 
222-23 (1973). Fagan 'writes in Chapter ten about the right to security from unreasonable 
searches as the Framers' reaction to British oppression of colonists. Id. Fagan makes a valid 
point: 
[Sltandards for police in conducting raids and arrests seem to fluctuate with 
the daily headlines. When police officials ... make a few mistakes and break 
into the wrong house for searching suspects, local citizens and judges tend to 
demand more cm"e in issuing search and an-est warrants. When an individual 
01" group commits acts of violence against people and property and remains 
at large for a period of time, public clamor for stern enforcement increases. 
Id. at 230-31. 
57 See id. at 222. 
58 See ill. at 222-31. 
59 See Thompson, supra note 29, at 998. 
60 See GINGER, supra note 56, at 379. 
61Id. 
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1900s, state violations of the Fourth Amendment had clearly begun.62 
As described by one historian, police sometimes conducted searches 
without first obtaining search warrants fi:om the courts, and they con-
ducted general searches even when their search warrants were limited 
as to the area and the persons to be searched.63 By 1914, in Weeks v. 
United States, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that, in order to enforce 
the Fourth Amendment in federal criminal prosecutions, it would ex-
clude all evidence obtained by a federal officer in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.64 In 1920, the Court extended this rule to ex-
clude not only evidence found in the illegal search but also evidence 
obtained as a result of information or leads gained from the illegal 
search, known as "fruits of the search."65 Then, in 1961, the Court 
held in Mapp v. Ohio that "all evidence obtained by searches and sei-
zures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inad-
missible in a state court. "66 This exclusionary rule, at least on its face, 
offered some measure of localized constitutional protection to victims 
of illegal searches and seizures.67 
Led by Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Supreme Court handed 
down another landmark decision in Terry v. Ohio in 1968.68 Terry 
definitively established that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit 
the police from stopping a person for questioning when they have a 
reasonable suspicion that the person may be armed and dangerous, 
even when that suspicion does not amount to the probable cause nec-
essary to make an arrest.69 Terry would become an important source of 
authority in racial profiling and Fourth Amendmentjurisprudence.7o 
In Terry, Cleveland Police detective Martin McFadden, patrolling 
in plain clothes in downtown Cleveland at 2:30 in the afternoon, ob-
served two men, Richard Chilton and John Terry, near a store.71 At 
trial, the veteran officer was unable to say precisely what first drew his 
eye to the men, but he testified that he was familiar with the vicinity, 
as he had patrolled it for over thirty years, and had a strong hunch 
62 See id. at 223. 
63 [d. 
64 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914); GINGER, supra note 56, at 223. 
65 See GINGER, supm note 56, at 223. 
66 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961); GINGER, sllpm note 56, at 223. 
67 See id. 
68 SeeTerryv. Ohio, 392 U.S.!, 30 (1968). 
69 See id. 
70 See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991); Brown v. Oneonta, 195 F.3d 
111,121 (2d Cir. 1999). 
71 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 4-6. 
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that the men were planning a crime.72 Mter observing them repeat-
edly wandering about the store window, he decided that they were 
casing the store for a robbery and feared that they may have a gun.73 
He thus approached the men, who had by then been joined by a third 
man, identified himself as a police officer, and proceeded to pat them 
down and question them.74 He found revolvers on two of the men, 
Terry and Chilton, and subsequently instructed the proprietor of the 
store to call a police wagon.75 
In deciding the case, the Court focused on the safety of the po-
lice officer, and did not take the race of the suspects into account.76 In 
doing so, it gave a clear articulation of a reasonableness standard that 
is decidedly race-ignorant:77 
Our evaluation of the proper balance that has to be struck in 
this type of case leads us to conclude that there must be a 
narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for 
weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he 
has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and 
dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause 
to arrest the individual for a crime. The officer need not be ab-
solutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is 
whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be 
warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in dan-
ger.78 
Terry thus established that the Fourth Amendment permits police 
to stop a person for questioning when they have a reasonable suspicion 
that the person may be armed and dangerous, even when that suspi-
cion does not amount to the probable cause necessary to make an 
arrest.79 This reasonableness test creates problems for minority plain-
tiffs because it does not take account of racial perceptions in an abu-
sive search.8o 
72 See id. 
73 See id. 
74 See id. at 6--7. 
75 See id. at 7. 
76 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. 
77 See id. 
78 [d. (emphasis added). The issue here is not the Court's focus on police safety, but 
rather it is the Court's omission of racial dynamics in the police encounter. See id. 
79 See id. 
80 See id.; Thompson, supra note 29, at 998-1005. 
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Although Chief Justice Warren recognized that "minority groups, 
particularly Negroes, frequently complain of wholesale harassment by 
certain elements of the police community," he nevertheless displayed 
only limited sensitivity for prevailing discriminatory attitudes.8} In par-
ticular, the Court stated that "[s]earch" and "seizure" are not talis-
mans. "We therefore reject the notions that the Fourth Amendment 
does not come into play at all as a limitation upon police conduct if 
the officers stop short of something called a 'technical arrest' or a 
'full-blown search.' "82 
The Warren Court's cautious approach may have done more 
harm than good for future plaintiffs.83 It has been argued that Terry 
actually set the stage for the narrow reading of the Fourth Amend-
ment that would later emerge in the 1996 decision of lVhren v. United 
States.84 Professor Anthony C. Thompson writes that the Court ig-
nored the perceptions of both police and potential victims and in-
stead constructed a reality in which "police officers do not act on the 
basis of considerations of race, the facts underlying a search or seizure 
can be evaluated without examining the influence of race, and the 
applicable constitutional mandate is wholly unconcerned with race. "85 
B. Problems that the Terry Decision Created for Victims Trying to Prove 
Violations Under the Fourth Amendment 
As the law has developed since Terry, a plaintiff who wants to pre-
vail on a § 1983 claim under the Fourth Amendment must overcome 
a difficult burden in proving that she was unreasonably seized.86 A sei-
zure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an 
81 See TelTY. 392 U.S. at 14. 27. 
82 [d. at 19. 
83 See Thompson, supra note 29, at 973. 
84 SeeWhren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806. 813 (1996); Thompson, supra note 29, at 
973. 
85 Thompson, supra note 29. at 962. 
86 See Brown Y. Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 340 (2<1 Cir. 2000). A § 1983 claim is a civil 
rights claim brought under federal statutes or under the U.S. Constitution for direct inva-
sions of the person. 42 U.S.CA § 1983 (2000); DAN B. DOBBS & PAUL T. HAYDEN, TORTS 
AND COMPENSATION 57 (1997). A federal cause of action arises under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 
when a person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of 
any State. territory or the District of Columbia, subjects. or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States. or other persons within the jurisdiction thereof, to the depri-
vation of any rights, privileges. or immunities secured by the U.S. Constitution and laws. [d. 
Such a person shall be liable to the party injm'ed in an action at law, suit in equity, or other 
proper proceeding for redress. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. 
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individual and asks a few questions.87 A seizure occurs when, by means 
of physical force or a show of authority, a police officer detains a per-
son in a way that would make a reasonable person believe that she was 
not free to leave.88 Pertinent factors identifYing a police seizure can 
include the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a 
weapon, physical touching of the person by the officer, language or 
tone indicating that compliance with the officer is compulsory, pro-
longed retention of a person's personal effects, such as airplane tick-
ets or identification, or a request by the officer to accompany him to a 
police station or a police room.89 
c. The Law Today: Whren v. United States 
If Terry narrowed remedies under the Fourth Amendment, then 
l'Vhren v. United States took bold steps to obliterate them.90 l'Vhren in-
volved a situation in which plainclothes policemen patrolling a high 
drug area in an unmarked vehicle observed a Nissan Pathfinder wait-
ing at a stop sign for "an unusually long time. ''91 The Pathfinder later 
turned suddenly and sped off at an "unreasonable" speed.92 The 
officers asserted that they stopped the vehicle to warn the driver 
about traffic violations, and upon approaching the automobile, they 
observed plastic bags of crack cocaine in Michael Whren's hands.93 
Both Whren and the driver of the truck were arrested.94 Prior to trial 
on federal drug charges, both men moved for suppression of the 
drugs that were seized, arguing that the stop had not been justified by 
either a reasonable suspicion or probable cause that the men were 
engaged in illegal drug activity, and that the officers' traffic-violation 
ground for approaching the truck was a pretext for a drug investiga-
tion.95 However, the motion to suppress was denied, the men were 
87 See Brown, 221 F.3d at 339-40. 
88 See id. at 340. 
89 See id. 
90 SeeWhren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). Led by Justice Scalia, the Su-
preme Court held that prior jurisprudence foreclosed any argument that the constitu-
tional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of individual 
officers. ld. at 808,813. 
91 ld. at 808; Angela]. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REv. 425, 432-
33 (1997) (describing the facts of Whren). 
92 See Whren, 517 U.S. at 808. 
93 See id. at 809. 
94 See id. 
95 See id. 
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convicted, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.96 The U.S. Supreme 
Court granted certiorari.97 
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Scalia embarked on a dis-
concerting line of Fourth Amendment analysis.98 He began by stating 
that, as a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is rea-
sonable "where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic 
violation has occurred. "99 He then pointed out that the petitioners 
accepted that the officers had probable cause to believe that various 
provisions of Washington D.C.'s traffic code had been violated.10o Jus-
tice Scalia stated: "Petitioners' difficulty is not simply a lack of 
affirmative support for their position. Not only have we never held, 
outside the context of inventory search or administrative inspection 
... that an officer's motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior 
under the Fourth Amendment; but we have repeatedly held and as-
serted the contrary. "101 
The Court then listed cases of random searches that were not 
rendered invalid because of their pre textual nature.102 It ultimately 
held that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops does not 
depend on the actual motivations of the individual officers in-
volved.I03 Moreover, the Court reasoned, the temporary detention of 
a motorist who the police have probable cause to believe has commit-
ted a civil traffic violation is consistent with the Fourth Amendment's 
prohibition against unreasonable seizures, regardless of whether a 
"reasonable officer" would have been motivated to stop the vehicle by 
a desire to enforce the traffic laws. 104 In a final statement, Justice 
Scalia wrote: 
96 See id. 
97 See Whrert, 517 U.S. at S09. 
98 See id. at SI0-11. 
99Id. at SIO. 
100 See id. 
!OI Id. at S12. 
102 See Whren, 517 U.S. at SI2-1!t The Conrt citer! prior jnrispnldence in which in-
fringing police behavior was not deemed nnconstitntionalllnder the FOllrth Amendment, 
discussing United States v. Villamonte-Marqnez, 4G2 U.S. 579, 5S4 n.3 (19S3) (holding an 
otherwise valid warrantless boarding of a vessel by customs officials not rendered invalid 
because customs officers were accompanied by a LOllisiana state policeman and were fol-
lowing an informant tip). and United States Y. Robinson, 414 U.S. 21S. 2!~G (1973) (hold-
ing a traffic-violation arrest not rendered invalid by fact that it was pretext for narcotics 
search). Id. 
103 See id. 
104 See id. 
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We think these cases foreclose any argument that the consti-
tutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual 
motivations of the individual officers involved. We of course 
agree with petitioners that the Constitution prohibits selec-
tive enforcement of the law based on considerations such as 
race. But the constitutional basis for objecting to intention-
ally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, not the Fourth Amendment. I05 
By ruling that subjective intentions play no role in "ordinary, 
probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis," the "Whren Court gave 
police extraordinarily wide latitude to stop motorists based on their 
own discretion. 106 Even more troubling, the decision expressly closed 
the door on Fourth Amendment search and seizure claims while im-
posing the burdens of Equal Protection analysis on victimized minor-
ity motorists. 107 
Commentators rightly have decried "Whren.l°8 In its amicus brief 
to the "Whren Court, the ACLU argued that pre textual searches violate 
the core principles of the Fourth Amendment, and warned that to 
sanction such searches was to invite discriminatory enforcement.I09 
Similarly, Professor Angela Davis writes that "Whren left Mrican Ameri-
cans and Latinos without an effective remedy for discriminatory pre-
textual traffic stops by suggesting that the Equal Protection Clause was 
the more appropriate constitutional basis for a cause of action.110 To 
many, "Whren basically furthers an "ends-means" approach that gives 
police broad discretion to do whatever is necessary to "get their 
Inan. "lll 
105 fd. 
106 See id. 
107 See lVlmm, 517 U.S. at 812-13. 
108 See HARRIS, supra note 25, at 12; Davis, sllpra note 91, at 432-33 (noting that the 
When Court dismissed the issue of police using pre textual stops to discriminate "in a single 
sentence"); Thompson, sllpra note 29, at 998. 
109 See HARRIS, sllpra note 25, at 12. 
llD See Davis, supra note 91, at 427. There are several ways for a plaintiff to plead inten-
tional discrimination that violates the Equal Protection Clause, and a showing of discrimi-
natory intent/animus is a key component of a successful claim. See Brown, 221 F.3d at 337. 
Professor Davis highlights the difficult burden of proof facing victims of pretextual stops 
who, under Whren, are forced to turn to the Equal Protection Clause rather than the 
Fourth Amendment for relief. See Davis, sllpra note 91, at 427. 
III See Davis, sllpra note 91, at 427. 
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D. Race-Ignorant Assumptions Inherent in "Vhren 
In contrast to these critics, the Court's decision in "Whren may 
seem quite reasonable to many. vVhy should race discrimination play 
any role in Fourth Amendment analysis? If plaintiffs contend that 
they have been unreasonably searched or seized, then perhaps race 
should have no place in the analysis. Maybe, as Justice Scalia asserts, 
claims of discriminatory enforcement of the law fall more appropri-
ately under the aegis of the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.112 
While this reasoning works well in theory, it fails to properly ac-
count for the complex web of racial attitudes, biases and perceptions 
that form the underpinnings of many interactions in society.l13 It as-
sumes a world in which racism and prejudice have been abolished, in 
which police, criminals and even people who are victimized are unbi-
ased, rational actors devoid of prejudice or racial stereotypes.114 This 
theoretical world is, unfortunately, not the reality of life in modern 
America.115 Conceptually speaking, the use of the race-ignorant ap-
proach by courts would result in a somewhat effective, if mechanical, 
disposition of the law-every person would be guaranteed a uniform 
process at trial,l16 However, as cases like Brown show, the race-ignorant 
approach adopted by many courts often proves to be beneficial to law 
enforcement and unfairly disadvantageous to people of color.117 Too 
often, courts turn a blind eye to the biased motivations of police 
officers and the mixed feelings of fear, anger and powerlessness that 
innocent minorities experience when subjected to police searches.118 
Indeed, as Professor Thompson points out, "If police officers target 
people of color for searches and seizures, this is precisely the kind of 
112 See Wlm'1l, 517 U.S. at 813. 
113 See Thompson, slIjJra note 29, at 991. As Thompson states. contrary to the Supreme 
Court's assumptions in Terry and its declaration in H7Iren, the subject of race cannot be 
treated as wholly divisible from the assessment of whether an officer had probable cause 
for an alTest or warrantless search or reasonable suspicion for a stop and frisk. !d. Many of 
the perceptions and judgments an officer I'eports on a witness stand-for example, the 
commission of a "furtive gesture," an "attempt to flee," "evasive" eye movements, "excessive 
nervousness"-will not be accurate renditions of the- suspect's actual behavior but rather a 
repOl't that has be-e-n fiItel'e-d through and distorted by the lens of stereotyping. !d. 
114 See id. 
Il5 See id. 
116 See id. 
iii See Brown v. One-onta, 221 F.3d ,~29, 338-,~9 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding plaintiffs failed 
to show discriminatory animus in police inve-stigation); Thompson, supra note- 29, at 991. 
118 See Brown, 221 F.'~d at 340 (reversing outcome of several Fourth Amendment 
claims); Thompson, supra note 29, at 991. 
258 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 21:243 
abuse of search and seizure powers that the framers of the Fourth 
Amendment sought to prevent. "119 Thus, the rationale behind VVhren's 
omission of race is at best an incomplete application of the Fourth 
Amendment.12o 
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT AND EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS IN THE 
MODERN COURTROOM: LINKING TERRY, WHREN AND BROWN 
Brown paints a vivid picture of how the race-ignorant approach of 
Terry and VVhren frustrates and undermines Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendment analysis in modern racial profiling cases.12l Both the 
original and superseding opinion in Brown were produced by a three-
judge panel of the Second Circuit and offer special insight into the 
process of ignoring racial perceptions in the courtroom.122 
Led by Judge John M. Walker, Jr., the panel began its original 
opinion by stating that Brown "bears on the question of the extent to 
which law enforcement officials may utilize race in their investigation 
of a crime. "123 Yet, in considering the plaintiffs' claims that they were 
unconstitutionally "seized" in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the 
court initially refused to find that such a seizure had occurred for sev-
eral victims of the police sweep.124 The panel also held that the plain-
tiffs in Brown had failed to demonstrate sufficient evidence of dis-
criminatory racial animus to justifY a claim under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.125 
Analyzing the Fourth Amendment component of the case, the 
panel failed to find any illegal searches in all but two situations.126 Ini-
tially, the judges were not persuaded that Ricky Brown, whose affidavit 
showed that he was stopped, surrounded and questioned in the street 
by three police officers, would have reasonably believed that he was 
unable to leave.127 Nor did the court initially believe that a police 
officer who had pointed a spotlight at Jamel Champen and said, 
"What, are you stupid? Come here. I want to talk to you," had used 
119 Thompson, slljJ/"a note 29, at 998. 
120 See irl. 
121 COlllpare Brown, 221 F.3d at 341-42 (vacating original opinion and restating denial 
of equal protection claim), with Browl/, 195 F.:~d at 121-23 (denying Fourth Amendment 
and Equal Protection claims to seyeral plaintiffs). 
122 COlllpare Brown, 221 F.3d at 339-42, with Brown, 195 F.3d at 121-23. 
123 Brown, 195 F.3d at 115. 
124 See irl. at 123. 
125 See ill. at 120. 
12G See irl. at 122. 
127 See irl. Ricky Brown is a 1999 graduate of Boston College Law School. 
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language or a tone that indicated that compliance was compulsory.128 
Instead, the court's original opinion brushed these acts aside as 
merely brief, rude and harmless encounters.129 
Addressing the Equal Protection component of the complaint, 
the panel held that when law enforcement officials possess a descrip-
tion of a criminal suspect's race and gender, and when no other evi-
dence of discriminatory racial animus exists, they can act on the basis 
of that description without violating the Equal Protection Clause.130 
The court promptly affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' § 1983 
claims under the Fourteenth Amendment as well as their claims un-
der 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985(3) and 1986.131 
In reaching this conclusion in his original opinion, Judge Walker 
outlined the ways that a plaintiff could plead intentional discrimina-
tion in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.132 He stated that the 
Equal Protection Clause essentially directs that all persons similarly 
situated should be treated alike.133 To show intentional discrimination 
based on race, a plaintiff can identify a law or policy that expressly 
classifies persons on the basis of race. 134 She can also identify a facially 
neutral law or policy that has been applied in an intentionally dis-
criminatory manner.135 Finally, a plaintiff can allege that a facially 
neutral scheme or policy has an adverse effect and was motivated by 
discriminatory animus.136 
The panel did not believe that most of the Brown plaintiffs had 
been treated in a manner that caught any of these "hooks."137 It held 
that this group had not identified any law or policy containing an ex-
press racial classification.138 Judge Walker also employed a deft twist of 
reasoning: he challenged the plaintiffs' factual premise as being in-
correct, maintaining that the police investigation in Brown was not a 
discriminatory policy in itself, but rather a race-neutral policy of inves-
128 See BrowI/, 195 F.3d at 122. 
129 See id. 
130 See id. at 115. 
m See id. at 116. 
132 Sreid. at 118-20. 
133 See Browll, 195 F.3d at 118 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 
U.S. 432, 439 (1985)). 
134 See id. (citing Hayden v. County of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1999)). 
135 See id. at 119 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886)). 
136 See id. (citing Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. HollS. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 
264-65 (1977)). 
137 See id. at 120. 
138 See Bmwn, 195 F.3d at 119. 
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tigating crimes using whatever descriptors were provided.139 He wrote, 
in short, that "the description [was] not a suspect classification, but 
rather a legitimate classification of suspects. "140 
The judicial reasoning in this early version of the Brown opinion 
demonstrates a powerful but mistaken assumption in Fourth 
Amendment and Equal Protection analysis: that interactions between 
police and minority plaintiffs are not influenced heavily by racial dy-
namics.I41 Judges who approach cases like Brown in this race-ignorant 
manner fail to take into account how racial perceptions between mi-
norities and police might make a person of color feel "seized" under 
the Fourth Amendment.142 Such courts also fail to consider how a po-
lice investigative policy might be fueled, even in subtle ways, by racial 
bias.143 To courts that follow the Brown approach, the subjective sub-
tleties of race are subordinated to a pro-law enforcement perspec-
tive. l44 Actions by both police officers and minority plaintiffs, even if 
corrupted by discriminatory animus, are thus treated as entirely de-
void of racial influence.145 The guiding principle of ignoring race, 
when handed down through cases from Terry to Whren to the panel's 
initial opinion in Brown, has troubling implications for resolving ra-
cially charged conflicts in the future.I46 
III. FOURTH AMENDMENT AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS: 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION, RACE-IGNORANT STANDARDS, AND 
RACIAL ATTITUDES AMONG MINORITIES AND POLICE 
To be sure, Judge Walker's original opinion in Brown shows how 
the race-ignorant approach can fail plaintiffs in both the Fourth 
Amendment context and in adjudicating claims under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.147 The opinion made clear that courts tend to overlook 
139 See id. Judge Walker wrote: "In short, plaintiffs' factual premise is incorrect: they 
were not questioned solely on the basis of their race. They were questioned on the alto-
gether legitimate basis of a physical description given by the victim of a crime." See id. 
HOld. 
141 See id. at 120; Thompson, supra note 29, at 998-99 (discussing race-neutrality). 
142 See irl. 
143 See Brown, 195 F.'~d at 120; HARRIS, silpm note 25, at 8-9; Tracey Maclin, "Black and 
Blue Ellcollnters"-Some Preliminary Thoughts about Fourth Amendment Seizures: Shollki Race 
Matter?, 26 VAL. U. L. REv. 243, 250, 252-61, 265-70 (1991), reprinted in YALE KAMISAR ET 
AL., BASIC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE at 117 (9th ed. 1999). 
144 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14, 27 (1968) (focusing on police safety, despite rec-
ognizing minority complaints of wholesale harassment); Brown, 195 F.3d at 120. 
145 See Brown, 195 F.3d at 120-22. 
146 See id. 
147 See iri. at 118-21. 
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the subjective perceptions of plaintiffs to impose a one-sided analysis 
of the facts.148 More often than not, this analysis has been consonant 
with the views of law enforcement officials}49 Although they outlined 
the factors that contribute to a "seizure" under the Fourth Amend-
ment, the three judges considering the Brown appeal did not initially 
give even brief consideration to the fact that some of the plaintiffs in 
the case might have felt threatened and detained by the police with-
out consent}50 Furthermore, the panel dropped its guard in consider-
ing the Equal Protection claim because it ignored the possibility of 
discriminatory racial animus in a policy drawn along raciallines}51 
A. Constitutional Tensions and Sociological Influences in Brown 
Taken in one sense, these flagrant omissions reflect flawed con-
stitutional reasoning}52 Indeed, commentators argue convincingly 
that the Framers intended the Fourth Amendment to be a check 
against exactly the kind of police abuses that occur in cases like 
Brown}53 It has also been advanced that the Founding Fathers did not 
automatically exclude consideration of race-based factors under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment}54 One 
scholar, Barbara Flagg, writes that all available evidence suggests that 
the Framers "did not understand the Fourteenth Amendment to con-
stitutionalize an abstract colorblindness principle. "155 
Taken in another vein, the phenomenon of ignoring subjective 
racial perceptions under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments 
acquires a more sinister cast}56 Sociologically speaking, the race-
ignorant approach might well be an indication, not only that judges 
misapply constitutional remedies, but also that their own racial biases 
pervade and corrupt supposedly neutral standards of reasonable-
148 See id. at 120-22. 
149 See id. at 120. 
150 See Brown, 195 F.3d at 120. The court's initial opinion mel-ely stated that it was not 
blind to the sense of frush-ation felt by the minority plaintiffs, urging police to be mindful 
of this phenomenon. Id. 
151 See id. 
152 See Barbara Flagg, "Was Blind but Now I See"; White Race Consciousness and the Require-
ment of Discriminatory Intent, in POWER, PRIVILEGE AND LAW. A Cn'IL RIGHTS READER 196-
97 (Leslie Bende1- & Daan Braveman eds., 1995); Thompson, supra note 29, at 998. 
153 See Brown, 221 F.3d at 339-42; Thompson, supra note 29. at 998. 
154 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-41 (1976) (reasoning discriminatory in-
tent needed to show violation of Equal Protection Clause); Flagg. supra note 152, at 199. 
155 Flagg. supra note 152. at 199. 
156 See id. at 197. 
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ness.157 Indeed, Professor Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas theorizes that these 
judicial assumptions of sameness are deeply embedded in the cultural 
ethos of mainstream society and its laws.I58 Because of these leanings, 
those who do not fit the prevailing cultural paradigm are at a 
significant disadvantage in the Fourth Amendment and Equal Protec-
tion adjudicatory process.159 
This disadvantage was readily apparent in Brown when Judge 
Walker created a hypothetical "racial role-reversal. "160 He speculated 
that the outcome of the case would have been the same if the town of 
Oneonta were mostly black and the minority plaintiffs were white.I61 
The convenient hypothetical that Judge Walker offered is an example 
of the race-ignorant approach at its worst: it assumes not only that dis-
criminatory attitudes, fear, abuse and mistrust do not exist in encoun-
ters between minorities and police, but also that a reversal of racial 
roles would produce virtually identical outcomes.162 
Consistent with Vargas' view, this kind of thinking is not only er-
rant, it is "a myth that constructs and reinforces hegemony by con-
structing those who are the same, from a dominant perspective, as 
virtuous Americans, and those who fall outside the homogenous core 
as nonvirtuous outsiders. "163 
The 1991 decision of Florida v. Bostick is an extended example of 
this flawed reasoning .164 In Bostick, two officers boarded a bus bound 
from Miami to Atlanta during a stopover in Fort Lauderdale.I65 The 
officers, who were participating in a drug interdiction program, 
walked up to Terrance Bostick and asked to search his luggage.I66 
They found cocaine in Bostick's bags and he was arrested on posses-
sion and trafficking charges.167 Bostick moved to suppress the cocaine 
157 See id.; Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Deconstrllcting HO'/no[geneousJ Amelicanus: The lWlite 
Ethnic Immigrant Narrative and Its Exclusionary Effect, 72 TuL. L. REv. 1493, 1493-1502 
(1998). Vargas says that judges continue to assume homogeneity while eschewing the het-
erogeneity that has become a part of the modern American landscape. See id. at 1502. 
158 See Vargas, supra note 157, at 1501. 
159 See id. at 1502. 
160 See Brown v. Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 338 (2d Cir. 2000). 
161 See id. 
162 See id.; Vargas, supra note 157, at 1525. 
163 Vargas, supra note 157, at 1506. 
164 See 501 U.S. 429, 436--38 (1991). 
165 See id. at 431. 
166 See id. at 432 (l'ecalling disputed facts recorded by the Florida Supreme Court). 
167 See id. 
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evidence on the grounds that it had been seized in violation of his 
Fourth Amendment rights.16S 
The U.S. Supreme Court, with Justice O'Connor writing for the 
majority, held that an officer conducting a random bus search pursu-
ant to passengers' consent does not per se violate the Constitution.I69 
The Court reasoned that the state court had erred in focusing on 
whether Bostick was free to depart rather than focusing on "the prin-
ciple that those words were intended to capture. "170 Justice O'Connor 
added that Bostick's feeling of being confined was not the result of 
coercive police behavior, but was instead the "natural" feeling of 
confinement shared by all passengers on a buS.l7l She analogized Bos-
tick's situation to the "dispositive" case of INS v. Delgado.172 In Delgado, 
Immigration and Naturalization Service agents conducted random 
factory visits and positioned themselves near factory exits while ques-
tioning workers)73 The Delgado Court concluded that although the 
factory workers may not have felt free to leave their workstations, their 
restriction was not the result of police activity)74 Likewise, Justice 
O'Connor reasoned that Bostick's freedom of movement was re-
stricted by a factor independent of abusive police conduct-by the 
mere fact that he was a passenger on a buS.175 
Although the Court in Bostick refrained from deciding whether or 
not a seizure had taken place, it refused to accord relevance to the 
subjective racial outlook of the detainee.176 Rather, Justice O'Connor 
implied that taking Bostick's perspective into account might have de-
viated from the presupposition of a reasonable innocent person per-
spective.177 Anything other than this "innocent person" standard, she 
hinted, would open the door to countless challenges by criminals.17s 
168 See id. 
169 See BO-ftick, 501 U.S. at 439. 
170 [d. at 435. 
171 See id. at 436. 
172 See id. (citing INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 218 (1984)). 
173 See Delgado, 466 U.S. at 212. 
174 Seeid. at 218. 
175 See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436. 
176 See id. at 438 (citing Michigan v. Chestenmt, 486 U.S. 567, 574 (1988)). Terrance 
Bostick relied on Ckesternul's indication that a seizure occurs when a reasonable person 
would believe that he or she is not "free to leave." !d. However,Justice O'Connor raised an 
interesting tension in the case by noting that Cheslernul states that the reasonable person 
standard ensures that the scope of Fourth Amendment pl'Otection does not vary with the 
subjective state of mind of the particular individual being appl'Oached. See id. 
177 See id. 
178 See id. Justice O'Connor thus concluded that Bostick's argument that he must have 
been seized because no reasonable person would fl'eely consent to a search of luggage that 
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On its face, this logic seems fair enough, given the public policy 
to assist law-enforcement for the public good.l79 However, upon closer 
inspection, the "innocent person" reasonableness standard, as wielded 
by courts, may not be as fixed or fair a test as the O'Connor opinion 
dictates.18o 
B. Race-Ignorance and Racial Bias by Courts 
The Supreme Court's decision to ignore racial factors and subjec-
tive perceptions in Bostick mirrors the myths and problems inherent in 
Judge Walker's role reversal syllogism.181 One need only push the syl-
logism a little further to expose its frailties.182 Consider, for example, a 
new hypothetical involving a venerable white male engaged in an eve-
ning stroll through a posh suburban neighborhood. The police ap-
proach the individual with hostility (i.e., "are you stupid? I said come 
over here!") and he is surrounded, questioned and frisked by three 
officers. Would this be deemed a "reasonable" intrusion on his pri-
vacy? Would he feel "seized," "detained" or compelled to stay? While 
many Americans might instinctively assume that some intrusion upon 
the white pedestrian's privacy occurred, this same sensitivity has his-
torically not been extended to the case of a minority pedestrian who is 
detained in a similar fashion. 183 It seems fair to say that, for most peo-
ple, images of race help define, in however subtle ways, the manner in 
which either situation is perceived.184 The race-neutral principle that 
judges advance rests on the stubborn belief that any consideration of 
race is antithetical to the attainment of justice, therefor legitimizing 
the decision to ignore the racial dynamics of a police encounter.185 
Unfortunately, instead of being truly neutral, judicial colorblind-
ness often is inherently skewed against people of color in racial 
he or she knows contains drugs "cannot prevail because the 'reasonable person' test pre-
supposes an innocent person." Id. 
179 See id.; Randall Kennedy, The State, Ctilllinal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A Com-
ment, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1255, 1259-60 (1994). 
180 See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 438. 
181 Compare Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434 (l'einforcing race-neutrality of Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 27 (1968», with Brown v. Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 338 (2d Cir. 2000) (discussing 
role reversal syllogism). 
182 See Brown, 221 F.3d at 338. 
183 See Flagg, supra note 152, at 199 (suggesting so-<:alled colorblindness operates as an 
unthinking imposition of white norms and expectations). 
184 See id. 
185 See id. 
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profiling cases.186 In this way, race-ignorant standards may be the most 
invidious form of racial bias from judges.187 Barbara Flagg's "transpar-
ency phenomenon" agrees that judges' assumptions often reflect a 
distinctively white way of thinking about the world: 
Most whites live and work in settings that are wholly or pre-
dominantly white. Thus whites rely on primarily white refer-
ents in formulating the norms and expectations that become 
criteria of decision for white decisionmakers. Given whites' 
tendency not to be aware of whiteness, it's unlikely that white 
decisionmakers do not similarly misidentify as race-neutral 
personal characteristics, traits, and behaviors that are in fact 
closely associated with whiteness.188 
The absence of diversity from most judges' lives makes hypotheti-
cal racial role-playing a difficult and often unproductive task.189 
Flagg's theory offers a useful framework for understanding how the 
decision to ignore race might itself reflect inherent racial preferences 
among judges.19o Since most judges have no experience of a "genuine 
cultural pluralism," in which white perspectives are not dominant, 
they do not have an "experiential basis" for easily creating race-
neutral reasonableness standards.191 Put differently, the easy assump-
tion that race either doesn't or wouldn't matter in deciding a Fourth 
Amendment case is itself evidence of racial preference-one that al-
lows individuals like Judge Walker to make biased decisions against 
minority plaintiffs based on flawed reasoning.192 
C. The Victim's Perspective: Min01ity Perceptions of Law Enforcement 
Officials 
Many people of color would undoubtedly look upon Judge 
Walker's syllogism with great skepticism.193 His premise, at least from 
the perspective of a minority plaintiff in Brown, clearly fails to account 
for the racial attitudes that are embedded in the public conscious-
186 See id. 
187 See id. 
188 Flagg, supra note 152, at 197. 
189 See id. 
190 See id. 
191 See id. 
192 See id. 
193 See Brown v. Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 338 (2d Cir. 2000); HARRIS, supra note 25, at 
36; Flagg, supra note 152, at 197. 
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ness.194 To a critical eye, Judge Walker's race-ignorant outlook repre-
sents a fictionalized view of society in which difficult questions of race 
are too easily disposed of by glib syllogisms and false claims of even-
handedness.195 
Awareness of this judicial bias intensifies minority attitudes to-
wards law enforcement.196 Negative attitudes are not just influenced 
by overt phenomenon like DWB.197 They are also fueled by a system of 
justice that appears to operate as if its law enforcement officials and 
judges are allied and aligned against people of color.198 This feeling in 
turn increases the fear, distrust and sometimes contempt that minori-
ties can feel for most police,199 Such an assertion may appear unrea-
sonably general and therefore naive, but it is arguably even more na-
ive to underestimate the extent to which the minority image of law 
enforcement officials is influenced by external experiences.2OO The 
race-ignorant judicial strategy may therefore exacerbate black percep-
tions ofpolice.201 
An example that might better illustrate how race-ignorant legal 
standards may indirectly intensify minority perceptions of police can 
be found in the black community'S response to racial hoaxes.202 Pro-
fessor Katheryn Russell points out that the ease with which the legal 
system abrogates minority rights when presented with fake evidence 
of a crime only deepens the racial divide.203 Studies show, for instance, 
that many blacks are more likely to believe race-related conspiracy 
theories than whites. 204 This belief stems from the aggregated effect of 
police and courts rushing to judgment in criminal cases in which a 
racial hoax is successfully employed by a white perpetrator.205 The 
194 See Brown, 221 F.3d at 338-42; HARRIS, supra note 25, at 36-37. 
195 See Broum, 221 F.3d at 338-42. 
196 See Russell, supra note 24, at 600. 
197 Compare HARRIS, supra note 25, at 12, with Russell, supra note 24, at 600 (describing 
how hoaxes help C1"eate racial division). 
198 See Russell, supra note 24, at 600; Vargas, supra note 157, at 1525-28. 
199 See Russell, supra note 24, at 600; Vargas, supra note 157, at 1525-28. 
200 See Russell, supra note 24, at 600. 
201 See id. 
202 See id. at 599-600. 
203 See id. at 600. In the comlIH'nt cited, Professor Russell notes that studies show that 
blacks are more likely to believe race-I'e1ated government conspiracy theories, while whites 
more readily perceive blacks as a criminal menace. See id. She discusses the trend in the 
context of hoaxes and their effect on society and the criminal justice system. See id. 
204 See id. (citing PATRICIA A. TURNER, I HEARD IT THROUGH THE GRAPEVINE: RUMOR 
IN AFRICAN AMERICAN CULTURE (1993); Lydia Saad & Leslie McAneny, Black Ame/ieans See 
LittleJustieejor Themselves, Gallup Poll Monthly, Mar. 1995, at 32). 
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damage caused by judges and police who mistakenly endorse fraudu-
lent claims against blacks and other minority groups may intensify the 
perception among minorities that the police are to be feared, not 
trusted. 206 \Vhen a white man, such as Charles Stuart, can fabricate a 
story that leads to a broad shakedown of an entire community of 
blacks, or when white New York City police officers can kill an un-
armed man with relative impunity, it is not surprising that African 
Americans will have difficulty seeing officers as protectors of their in-
dividual rights.207 This has the unfortunate cumulative effect of 
influencing future street encounters with the police.2oB 
\Vhen asked how much confidence they have in the police, stud-
ies have shown that twenty-six percent of blacks and twenty-three per-
cent of racial minorities say "very little" or "none," compared to only 
nine percent of whites. 209 Thirty-two percent of blacks and thirty per-
cent of all nonwhites rate the honesty and ethical standards of police 
officers as "low" or ''very low," compared to only eleven percent of 
whites.210 These statistics underscore the assertion that current per-
ceptions among minorities are significantly different than those 
among whites, and that these perceptions might be a significant factor 
enhancing feelings of fear during police stops.21l These feelings go 
beyond mere frustration at a traffic stop; they point to a deeper sense 
of vulnerability and powerlessness that plays a viable role in 
searches.212 As Russell suggests, the "collective racial consciousness of 
each group gains more strength and permanence with each hoax. "213 
Since these attitudes play such a palpable part in Fourth Amendment 
cases, judges' heightened sensitivity to them could help courts better 
interpret whether a detainee considers herself seized in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment,214 
If the Walker court in Brown, for instance, was truly sensitive to 
such perceptions, then it would undoubtedly have quickly understood 
206 See id. 
207 See id.; Howard Chua-Eoan, supra note 24, at 24 (descdbing the aftermath of the 
Diallo trial). 
208 See Russell, supra note 24, at 594-95. 
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TICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1995, at 133 
(GPO 1996». 
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how an African American spoken to in a derisive manner, or sur-
rounded by several officers, might feel that he was not free to leave.215 
This is even more apparent when one considers that the officers' 
statements were made in the context of a police sweep of a town with 
a small, outnumbered and therefore vulnerable minority popula-
tion.216 Judges must navigate these complex waters in order to more 
accurately adjudicate seizure claims under the Fourth Amendment.217 
However, because the court in Brown was substituting its own race-
neutral perspective, it initially failed to consider either of these in-
stances to be violative procedures.218 Judge Walker's original opinion 
superficially dismissed the derisive comments as a simple question.219 
This difference in perception is well-known among members of 
minority groupS.220 Anecdotal reports of run-ins with police abound 
among people of color at every level of the socioeconomic scale.221 In 
the black community, this has resulted in fear, resentment and altered 
behavior in dealings with police.222 Such attitudes alone exacerbate 
the tensions between police and minorities caught in a police 
search.223 
But while perceptions of fear and mistrust for police have bur-
geoned within the black community based on overt acts of racism, 
these perceptions are heightened also by the race-ignorant approach 
of courts.224 By using a suspect, race-neutral analysis to adjudicate 
Fourth Amendment and Equal Protection claims, courts have instilled 
a sense in many members of the minority community that judges and 
215 See Brown v. Oneonta, 195 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 1999) (failing to discuss racial per-
ceptions and bias in police investigation); Sklansky. supra note 209, at 314 n.203, 325-26. 
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cator of suspicious conduct and dangerousness, and that verbal abuse and harassment 
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NAACP found that law-abiding black pal'ents warn their children about the police, and 
that the average African-American family does not know whether they should call the po-
lice, stop for the police. or help the police-all for fear of becoming a target of police 
misconduct themselves. See id. 
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police work in alliance against minorities, exacerbating the perceived 
threat posed by street officers.225 
Several months after issuing its shocking initial opinion, the 
Walker panel issued a sparsely amended opinion that sharply reversed 
the initial denial of several plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claims.226 
The new opinion added placatory language that empathized with 
"innocent plaintiffs" that might have been humiliated in the Oneonta 
criminal investigation.227 Conduct once described as merely "rude" 
and "brief" by the court was now characterized in the new opinion as 
unconstitutionally "compulsory. "228 
But despite its grudging willingness to consider the subjective 
perspective of the innocent victims of the police sweep, the Brown 
court still refused to acknowledge the overarching racial perceptions 
and discriminatory bias in the case.229 At no point, for instance, did 
the opinion explicitly address the issue of race or racial perceptions in 
the police stop.230 Nor did the amended opinion recognize any dis-
criminatory motive in conducting the police sweep.231 The new opin-
ion simply reiterated Judge Walker's reasoning that "defendants' pol-
icy was race-neutral on its face" and lacked "evidence of 
discriminatory animus. "232 
This amended outcome in Brown offers scant hope for future 
plaintiffs-as evinced by circuit judge Chester J. Straub's dissent in a 
subsequent denial of rehearing en bane by the Second Circuit.233 
225 See Flagg, supra note 152, at 197; Russell, sllpra note 24, at 600. 
226 See Brown v. Oneonta, 221 F.3d ,~29, 341 (2d Cir. 2000). 
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Judge Straub worried that although the Walker court had managed to 
reverse some of its earlier inequitable decisions, the new opinion nev-
ertheless arrived at a "grave conclusion" by failing to recognize dis-
criminatory animus in an investigation "based on a witness's pre-
dominantly racial description. "234 Urging his colleagues to reconsider 
the decision, the judge went on to say that "[t]he judges of this Court 
obviously disagree sharply over the serious and difficult constitutional 
questions presented in this case, which appear to be of first impres-
sion in this Circuit and every other. For that reason alone, if not for 
any other, this case would seem to demand in bane reconsideration. "235 
The reconstituted Brown decision, therefore, is far from a panacea for 
aggrieved minority plaintiffs in the racial profiling context.236 
However, the United States Supreme Court has shown some will-
ingness of late to slow down its expansion of police discretion under 
the Fourth Amendment.237 In Florida v. fL., the Court issued a 
unanimous ruling that an officer may not stop and frisk a pedestrian 
based only on an anonymous caller's tip.238 In fL., an anonymous 
caller reported that a black male wearing a plaid shirt near a pawn 
shop had a concealed gun.239 A short while later, police officers spot-
ted a male who fit the caller's description and ordered him to put his 
hands on a bus shelter.240 An officer then noticed a gun protruding 
from the suspect's left pocket, and arrested the boy, referred to only 
as J.L. in the court record.241 
At trial, the boy (who, at the time of the arrest, was ten days shy 
of his sixteenth birthday) was charged under state law with carrying a 
concealed firearm without a license, and with possessing a firearm 
while under the age of eighteen.242 His counsel subsequently moved 
to suppress the gun as the fruit of an unlawful search, and both the 
trial court and Florida Supreme Court upheld the motion under the 
Fourth Amendment.243 
234 Id. at 789. 
235 Id. at 791. 
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237 See Florida v.J.L., No. 98-1993, 2000 WL 309131, at *4-5 (2000); David G. Savage, 
Supreme Court Curbs Police Power to Stop, Search Based on Tips, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 29, 2000, 
atA3. 
238 SeeJL., 2000 W.L. 309131, at *5. 
239 See id. at *2. 
240 See id. 
241 See id. 
242 See id. 
243 SeeJL., 2000 WL 309131, at *2. 
2000] Racial Profiling and the Fourth Amendment 271 
At the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion 
stated that the tip "lacked the moderate indicia of reliability" needed 
to admit the gun as evidence.244 She reasoned that an accurate de-
scription of a subject's readily observable location and appearance 
was reliable to the extent that it helped police to correctly identifY the 
person who the tipster meant to accuse.245 Referring to Terry, she 
stated that the reasonable suspicion at issue in J.L. required that a tip 
be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to iden-
tifY a determinate person.246 In this instance, said Ginsburg, "[T]he 
single phone message 'left the police without a clue concerning the 
caller's knowledge or credibility. The Fourth Amendment is not so 
easily satisfied. "'247 Moreover, she warned, a lenient rule for anony-
mous tips could allow innocent people to be targeted for embarrass-
ing searches.248 
In a rare but guarded rebuff to the police, the Court concluded 
that an anonymous tip, without a standard indicia of reliability, does 
not justifY a stop and frisk under the Fourth Amendment. 249 The 
Court carefully limited its ruling to the facts of the case, refusing to 
speculate about circumstances under which the danger alleged in an 
anonymous tip might be so great (i.e., a call identifYing someone car-
rying a bomb) as to justifY a search even without a showing of reliabil-
ity.250 The Court also implied that the case might have been decided 
differently if the youth had been seen in an airport or on school 
grounds, where public safety concerns are greater and individuals 
cannot expect to have the same standard of privacy.251 
The ruling in J.L. reminds us that there are indeed upper limits 
to police discretion under the Constitution.252 However, it is impor-
tant to remember that the Court's ruling in J.L. was narrow and 
hedged.253 Had the anonymous caller given a name and reported 
other details that could have been checked, the search would proba-
bly have been upheld.254 While J.L. may take a small step toward pro-
244 Id. at *3. 
245 See id. at *3-4. 
246 See id. at *4; TelTY Y. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1. 30 (1968). 
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tecting the rights of minorities under the Fourth Amendment, it does 
not overrule over a decade of decisions giving officers great leeway to 
conduct abusive searches.255 
D. Protecting Police Discretion: The Importance of Law Enfarcement 
In the effort to protect minorities from the dangers of race-
ignorant Fourth Amendment decisions, judges must also stay attuned 
to the attitudes and objectives of police officers.256 From a law en-
forcement standpoint, the Court's ruling in JL. may well be horrifY-
ing to many.257 One national police leader found the ruling "baffling," 
and said that it would leave officers and the public more vulnerable to 
gun-toting thugS.258 
These concerns are no less relevant to proper Fourth Amend-
ment analysis than the feelings of anger, mistrust and vulnerability 
experienced by people of color when subjected to unreasonable 
searches.259 Although the Court's unwillingness to broaden police dis-
cretion inJL. is encouraging, one cannot overlook the alarming reali-
ties that led up to the event: an adolescent boy was walking the streets 
of Miami carrying a gun in his pocket.26o Thus, while courts must 
strive to develop a more sophisticated method of analyzing these 
Fourth Amendment and Equal Protection profiling claims, they must 
also avoid overly constraining police in the execution of their du-
ties.261 
A proposal for a more equitable interpretation of the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments would not, however, discredit the essential 
tools of good policing: street-savvy, intuition and experience.262 These 
factors help save many thousands of lives each year, including, as Jus-
tice Warren correctly noted in TnTY, those of the police officers them-
selves.263 
Furthermore, some commentators note that members of poor 
black communities are often the ones most frequently in need of ef-
255 See id. (citing cases from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) to Alabama v. \\11ite, 496 
U.S. 325, 332 (1990)). 
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fective policing.264 Professor Randall Kennedy addresses this trend by 
stating that "[t]he most lethal danger facing Mrican Americans in 
their day-to-day lives is not white, racist officials of the state, but pri-
vate, violent criminals (typically black) who attack those most vulner-
able to them without regard to racial identity. "265 Although Kennedy 
perhaps overstates the black cry for police protection (indeed many 
blacks in our nation's most beleaguered inner-cities may have aban-
doned hope of police protection) he accurately highlights the impor-
tance of effective policing in the minority community.266 
But, as unwise as it would be to adopt an extreme position that 
runs counter to the goals of public safety, good police work and effec-
tive law enforcement, courts must still do more to recognize the nega-
tive stereotypes and attitudes that drive some police behavior.267 
Moreover, judges have to be cognizant of how public opinion in the 
profiling context creates a cloud of bias that affects encounters be-
tween police and minorities on our nation's streets.268 Katheryn Rus-
sell notes that this public bias encourages an "us-versus-them" senti-
ment among police officers and the public, which challenges the 
credibility of black claims of harassment, while making blacks increas-
ingly suspicious of police motives.269 Characterizations that demonize 
rogue officers while romanticizing dangerous criminal offenders will 
only arouse more anger, fear, and distrust, instead of inspiring more 
sophisticated decision-making by police and courts.270 
Critics who support expanding police discretion would argue that 
the interests of effective crime fighting require us to use the best 
means available to fight crime.271 The argument supposes that since 
half of those imprisoned in this country for drug offenses are Mrican 
American, stopping a disproportionate number of Mrican-American 
motorists is not racist, but is rather good police work. 272 Author Lisa 
Walter notes that this argument "not only admits the use of race as a 
proxy for criminality, but also argues that it is natural or proper to do 
so. "273 
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Courts must guard against such use of racial proxies as they con-
sider the scope of police discretion.274 A more careful and sophisti-
cated approach to Fourth Amendment and Equal Protection analysis 
will enable courts to do this while better assessing when police officers 
have committed constitutional violations.275 
Rather than adopting a "distinctive stance characterized by hostil-
ity toward the agencies of crime control, sympathetic identification 
with defendants and convicts, and a commitment to policies aimed at 
narrowly constraining the powers of law enforcement authorities," an 
approach that looks closely at racial attitudes involved in Fourth 
Amendment and Equal Protection cases can still secure the public 
good of effective law enforcement.276 
IV. RECALIBRATING THE REASONABLENESS STANDARD OF THE COURTS 
A heightened awareness of inherent bias among judges, percep-
tions of fear and distrust of police among minorities, and the attitudes 
and objectives of law enforcement officials would enable courts to 
make more equitable decisions in the search and seizure context.277 
As Barbara Flagg recommends, judges need to adopt a more skeptical 
outlook on race neutrality in order to accomplish this.278 Courts must 
thus recalibrate standards of reasonableness used to adjudicate 
profiling cases in two ways.279 First, judges must evaluate cases with an 
awareness that it is both harmful and unfair to presume that true 
race-neutrality exists in the courtroom and on the streets.280 Second, 
judges must adjudicate such cases with an understanding of how ra-
cial attitudes held by police and by people of color contribute to viola-
tions of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.281 
Another way to conceptualize this shift in thinking might be for 
courts to recognize that the notion of police infringement on rights is 
not easily quantifiable or disposed of by race-ignorant decision-
making.282 Encounters between white police and black detainees, for 
instance, can frequently be dynamic situations influenced by a broad 
274 See id. 
275 See id. at 265-66. 
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variety of overt and subtle racial factors. 283 Rarely should such intru-
sions invite as cold and unflinching a response as that offered by 
courts that would impose race-ignorant standards.284 Instead, judges 
should develop a broader reasonableness standard through a more 
searching assessment of how feelings of fear, danger, vulnerability and 
even prejudice might make a detainee feel powerless in a search and 
seizure situation.285 Likewise, if it were easier to understand role re-
versals in cases like Brown, judges might more readily consider how 
they would respond to similar police actions in their own neighbor-
hoods.286 Unfortunately, because many judges do not recalibrate their 
perceptions to understand how minority plaintiffs might see police 
actions, they often overlook constitutional harms suffered by those 
plaintiffs. 287 
The fear and detention factors used in Fourth Amendment sei-
zure cases should not be considered solely from a judge's race-neutral 
standpoint. 288 Fair decision-making requires something more.289 
Judges must do more to place themselves in the shoes of minority 
plaintiffs, utilizing a heightened standard for legal and factual re-
view. 29o More importantly, judges must be aware that their race-neutral 
standards might not be as free of racial bias as the adjudicatory proc-
ess necessitates. 291 Under a more careful, race-sensitive inquiry, a 
judge such as Brown's Judge Walker might more easily see how an in-
nocent person of color could consider herself seized or discriminated 
against when aggressively approached by police in her home, in a car, 
on the bus, or in the street.292 
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CONCLUSION 
As a general trend, the legacy of racial profiling cases describes 
an history of judicial deference to police discretion.293 In situations 
involving members of the minority community and the police, many 
of these outcomes have been skewed by the imposition of race-
ignorant judicial standards in Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment 
analysis.294 These standards of reasonableness routinely ignore racial 
dynamics and assume that judicial impartiality is not vulnerable to its 
own racial biases.295 
In order to achieve more equitable results under the Fourth 
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, judges need to move away from ideological assumptions 
of sameness.296 In turn, they must utilize a reasonableness standard 
that permits a more sophisticated understanding of racial percep-
tions.297 By gaining an understanding of what Professor Sylvia Vargas 
calls "the full complexity of difference," judges can better resolve 
conflicts between the races.298 
But exactly how should such a process be implemented? What 
would be the best mechanism for enhanced judicial scrutiny of search 
and seizure cases? One challenge facing judges seeking change is how 
to factor difficult racial attitudes and perceptions into legal analyses. 
Most judges simply lack familiarity with diverse cultures.299 An erro-
neous assessment of an individual's racial perceptions might induce a 
court to hold that a reasonable search was unreasonable, or vice-versa. 
Even worse, an over-emphasis on racial perceptions might itself give 
rise to a host of new biases.30o In light of this difficulty, it is challeng-
ing, if not impossible to design a bright-line standard for factoring 
subjective racial perceptions into a Fourth Amendment and indeed, 
an Equal Protection analysis.301 
A sensible starting point for judges might be to simply challenge 
their own notions of race-neutral objectivity in Fourth Amendment 
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and Equal Protection cases.302 To begin to question how oveniding 
beliefs and life experiences create views that infiltrate the courtroom. 
Judges can and should take proactive steps, through workshops and 
sensitivity training, to learn more about the diverse individuals who 
appear before them. By taking a critical look at the assumptions that 
infiltrate ostensibly objective standards,judges might begin to develop 
a better understanding of racial dynamics.303 This sophisticated 
method of review would allow judges to see behind abusive police 
stops and help balance the scales of equity for all Americans.304 
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